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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

CHRISTENSEN DIAMOND PRODUCTS,
A Corporation,
Respondent,
No. 8039

vs.

THERON S. COVEY, et al,
Appellam,ts.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

' ,.~:. ,-~ J

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents filed an action to recover the reasonable value of diamond drill bits furnished for the drilling
of an oil well in lTintah County, lT tah. The action was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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filed against a large number of Defendants, including
M. E. l3aird and H. L. Robbins who were active in the
drilling of the well, a number of defendants who had
pun·ha~ed eertifieateH of interest in the well as referred
to at 1{. 81, and which certificates did not require the
drilling of a well, as well aH the Appellants who refused
to purcha~e such eertificates in that form (see un-numbered Exhibit entitled "(;ertificate of Ownership of
Interest in Oil and Gas Lease") but prepared instead
a ~o-called joint operating agreement (Exhibit C) which
\vill be further described.
l~espondents recovered judg1nent in the sum of $1,7:~j.9G ( R. 17) against those defendants who had executed
the joint operating agreement and judgment of no cause
of action \Vas entered as to all other defendants. The
defendants Baird and Robbins have not appealed.
The Court found that Appellants and Baird and
Robbins were 1nining partners under the joint operating
agreen1ent and were jointly responsible for all of the
debts of the nuning partnership.
By stipulation of the parties (R. 21 and 22) it is
provided that the record in the case of Mud Control
Laboratories, Inc., a corporation, vs. Theron 8. Covey,
et al, which is case No. 8025 in this court and which was
consolidated with this case for trial in the court below
(R. 81) could be used as the record- in this case, insofar
as the transcript of testimony is concerned. All references herein higher than page 25 of the record 'vill be
refer ences to the record in No. 802'5. Where such references are to pages other than portions of the tranSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~rribed

testiinony such \vill be indicated. The Exhibits
were introduced "·ithout referenee to either case and
reference to exhibits herein \Yill be to the exhibits in No.
S0~5. The Court found that Appellants and l\l. E. Baird
and H. L. R.obbins entered into a written contract entitled Joint Operating . .\gree1nent (Exhibit C) for the
purpose of developing a leasehold and that in accordance
\vith said agreen1ent a \vell known as the Slaugh N·o. 1
\V" ell "-as drilled on the property described in Finding
Xo.l (R. 13 and 14). The Court also found:
·~5.
That at all ti1nes hereinabove mentioned the
defendants, _jl. E. Baird and H. L. Robbins, carried on
business as c·o-partners under the fir1n na1ue and style
of "'Baird & Robbins Drilling Con1pany"; that in said
partnership capacity the said M. E. Baird and II. L.
Robbins, jointly with the Coveys, conducted the· operation and drilling of the well on the above-described property.
6. That by the ter1ns of the aforesaid "'Joint Operating Agree1nent" the said l\1. E. Baird and H. L. Robbins, a partnership, vvere authorized alternately to einploy individuals for the actual drilling and operation of
the vvell or to e1nploy the services of a l'Orporation to
be w·holly owned by the said M. E. Baird and H. L. Robbins; that on or about December 26, 1948, the said 1\tf. E.
Baird and H. L. Robbins did, in fact, organize and forn1
a Utah corp·oration wholly owned by the said 1\f. E. Baird
and H. L. Robbins, having the corporate name of "Baird
& Robbins Drilling Cornpany, Inc."; that thereafter the
:-;nid 1\l. FJ. Baird and H. L,j. Robbins intermingled the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fund8 and aHHetH of the aforesaid partnership and of the
afo rPsaid corporation and generally c·onducted the busiIH~HH affairs of the said partnership and of the said corporation, particularly \vith regard to the drilling of the
af'ore~aid well, without regard to the individual capacity
or ~Pparateness of the said partnership and corporation,
to tllP extent that the said Haird & Robbins Drilling Company, Inc., had no separate or independent activity, function, or existence in the drilling of the aforesaid well or
the developruent of the afore~aid property.

10. That in selling and delivering the aforesaid
dia1nond drill bits to the said 1\tf. E. Baird and H. L.
Robbins the plaintiff, (~hristensen Dia1nond Products
l~o1npany did not rely upon the separate and independent
credit of the defendants Covey" (R. 14 and 15).
The joint operating agree1nent is Exhibit C, and
contains the following provisions deemed material on
the question whether a 1nining partnership existed between Baird and Robbins, or their partnership, or their
corporation and the Appellants.
'"THIS AGREEMENT, entered into this 5th
day of January, 1949, by and between M. E. Baird
and H. L. Robbins, a partnership, with their principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah,
and Sybil T. Baird, wife of M. E. Baird, first parties, hereinafter called 'operator,' and S.M. Covey,
A. A. Covey, H. T. Covey, S. G. Covey, T. S.
Covey and F. K. Gilroy, hereinafter called 'Coveys,' second parties, hereinafter collectively called
'non-operators.'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I.

II.

(-.ONSIDER.L~TION

Non-operator~
tie~ the 8Ulll

.A...

agree to pay first parof Sixteen Thousand
Dollars ($16,000.00) as follows: Eight
Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00) concurrently \Yith the following and Eight
'rhousand Dollars ($8,000.00) upon
the connnencernen t of the drilling
of the first well as described in paragraph I\:"" herein :

C.

Non-operators further agree to purchase pipe of a description hereafter
to be agreed upon by the parties at a
cost of not to exceed Seven Thousand,
Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00),
vvhich pipe shall be owned by Coveys
and available subject to the conditions
hereinafter set forth. Coveys agree to
deliver their checks, payable to owner
and seller of said pipe, from whom operator agrees to obtain bill of sale to
said pipe, in fayor of the second parties.

EF·F-ECTIVE PERIOD
This agreernent is to rernain in force
for the full term of any and all of the
leases or agreernents as heretofore described and of any renewals or extensions thereof, whether by production
or otherwise. It i:-3 expressly understood and agreed bet-\\Teen the parties
hereto that by these presents the first
parties haYe tran~ferred to the Second

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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parties twelve per cent ( 12o/o) of the
one hundred per cent (100%) interest.
Ill.

POS'SESSION OF OPERATOR
"\. (Jperator shall have the sole right of
prospecting and e~ploring the lands,
subject to this agreement, and drilling
for, producing, storing, transporting
and retnoving oil, gas and other hydro-carbon substances from the lands,
~ubject to this agreement, together
\vith the right, subject to the terms
of the several leases herein described,
to establish, maintain and repair on
the lands or to remove therefron1.
tanks, boilers, buildings, machinery
and other apparatus or equipment,
pipe lines, pole lines, power lines, telephone and telegraph lines, rods and
other appurtenances which 1nay be
necessary or convenient in the production, treat1nent, storage or transportation of oil, gas or other hydro-carbon
substances on or from the lands as
1nay be necessary for the purposes of
operating and carrying out the terms,
provisions and purposes of this agreement.
B.

The nu1nber of employees, the selection of such employees, the hours of
labor and compensation for services
to be paid any and all such employees
shall be solely at the discretion and
determination of the operator and
such employees shall be the employees
of the operator and under its sole direction and orders.
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Operator agrees to drill a well on the
land described in paragraph 1 of 'De~eri ptions: and at a location on said
land determined by the operator and
to eouunence the drilling of said well
on or before the first day of February,
1949. The Sixteen Thousand Dollars
($16,000.00) hereinbefore na1ned and
paid to the first parties sha1l be used
by the operator for payment of drilling and development charges in connection with the drilling of said well
and no part of any.costs or expenses
for the drilling of said well or the
maintenance of this lease, such as the
payment of Two Thousand Dollars
($2,000.00) as rental charge (should.
the payment be necessary to continue
said lease in full force and effect) shall
be charged or be a claim upon the
second parties. In the event said well
shall he a dry hole, no costs, including
costs of abandonment shall be a clain1
against second parties. If said vvell
produces oil or gas in commercial
quantities, all of the development costs
· and expenses, including, but not limited to, drilling, casing, tubing, rods,
pumping equip1nent, well head connections, separators and tanks, incurred
by operator in connection with the
drilling and equip1nent of said well for
production, shall be borne and paid
for exclusively by operator.
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It

() perator shall conduct its operation

in a good and workmanlike manner
and in accordance with good oil field
prtH·tice. If operator so desires it may
(~lnploy its own tools and equipment
in the drilling of said well or it may
entploy the services of a corporation
wholly owned hy operator in which
event it is understood said corporation
shall have no elairn against the second
parties, nor any lien against said leasehold or any oil, gas or other hydroearbon substances produced on or
fro111 the lands.

C. Operator hereby agrees and undertakes to provide a corporate surety
bond in the sum of not less than Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), protecting, holding harmless and indemnifying the second parties from all acts
or failures to act in connection with
first parties' operations or its contracting parties under this agreement,
which bond shall be filed with second
parties.
,~I.

DEVELOPMENT AND DISCOVERY
All drilling and development by the
operator shall be conducted in a good
and workmanlike manner, in accordance with good oil field practice. All
drilling and development charges, except for the first well as hereinbefore
described, shall be charged to the joint
account of the parties hereto under the
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teru18 and eonditions described herein
and H8 de~eribed jn the accounting
proeedure attached hereto and 1narked
· l~~xhibit B' and hereby 111ade a part
hereof, on the basi8 of two per cent
(2%) to each of the Coveys, constituting t\Yelve per cent ( 12?'o) as nonoperators and eighty-eight per cent
(88%) to operator.

·vii.

OF OPERATIONS
NON-OPERATORS
APPR,O\TAI~

. A..

BY

The written approval of non-operators
shall be required
1.

For the abandonment of any well
which has produced oil or gas in
coinmercial quantities for a period of thirty ( 30) days.

2.

For any capital expenditure of
operator in any sum in excess of
Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) for which non-operators will
be expected to pay their share of
the costs in cash, except that the
\Vritten eonsent by non-operators
of the drilling of any well shall
be construed to mean approval of
all necessary expenditures in drilling, completing and equipping
such well ineluding the necessary
lease tankage.

3.

F'or the sale and disposition of
surplus materials and equipn1ent
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by operator, it being understood
that all equipment facilities and
structures purchased on account
of the joint operation of the parti<~s hereto (except all such equiptnent, facilities and structures
placed on or tnoved on the de~eri bed premises by operator for
tlH~ drilling of the first well as
he J'(~ i_n de~(·rihed shall be presutned to be the property of the
owner until non-owner shall prove
differently. Thereafter all property purchased shall be presumed
to be joint property until operator
~hall prove differently.) shall be
O\\~ned
eighty - eight per cent
(88%) by operator, twelve per
per cent (12%) by second parties.
B.

The following specific rights, privileges, and obligations of non-operators, and each of them, are hereby expressly provided, but not by way of
li1nitation or exclusion of any other
rights, privileges or obligations of
the said party :

1.

Non-operators shall have access
to the lands, subject to this agreement, at all reasonable times to
inspect and observe operations of
every kind and character upon the
property.

2.

Non-operators shall have access at
all reasonable times to any and all
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inforn1ation pertaining to wells,
drilling, production secured and
oil Inarketed and to the books,
records and vouchers relating to
the operation of the lands, subject to thi~ agree1nent.
3.

\'III.

Operator shall, upon request, furnish the non-operators with daily
drilling reports, true and complete copies of well logs, as soon
as possible after the preparation
thereof, tank tables, daily gauge
and run tickets and reports of
stock on hand the first of each
rnonth; and shall also, upon request, make available samples and
cuttings from any and all wells
drilled in which non-operator has
an interest on the said lands.

DITTIES

O:B~

OPERATORS

A.

Operator shall, at all tunes, keep the
joint interests of the parties hereto in
and to the leases and product therefrom and equip1nent free and clear
of all labor and 1neehanic's liens and
encumbrances. * ':~ *

B.

Non-operators shall have a lien on the
interests of the operators in said
leases and agreements and the oil
and gas produced therefrom the proceeds thereof and the rnaterial and
equiprnent thereof to secure the payn1ent of operator's proportionate
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.· . ·;,,.,, ()l ·,·,r:ri·n;·,~4al·~,i<lfHiM)l(fJSts and expenses of de, :: !.·';·:t,·>' ;-. n.> J·,frfWn}n~fl-n«· 1<pperating the said lands
... qed '>.·! (\j J):~Jfor)·H!fi.·DJl.JiP<p1l~ of keeping said prop•··. ·, :ll L.~·)·, :·T,d· .. 1 ~rt~,!r~~1~Jl~t~Jear of liens and encum. < • . .~ J , 11 1; 'I 1 ,h L'f\.ll<;'~ti. H }lPOJH t the
property of non,j:!·, . . p.JJO!'(,ttor&,t ~~f sums recovered fron1
tlu~ di~position 'of operator's property
.. , ':; ,' ;; , . '·r ·: ,. · j; (Pr.:t~~<ll~YlJ.~JJt ~f: the obligations of
......
1. I .. ;.: H,.J .. '> ~he;~oue.rato.r<H~tall be applied first to·
: , ·~ J} ~: ';!,·,! . (:Qfits,.l S~@i'J.rt·iJlPOn the obligations of
. _
n•.r.:-. ~~B .·:: n1 II·~·., ~h~ pp~rAtO,J;~~Jlpd any balance rernain- --~~~\z-~·
: ·(,; 'i
;· ·,·((, 'L~J 'J'~ng th~reAftfter:J~hall be paid to the op- ·;;
. ··~. :·,•. ·.~J, '· ,·":'->.ti!~ra~n!· o,r,t;,;it$JSUccessors or assigns."

,::'! , Ri~h~f\1 :p:;~u~k~~rH·Z.~ \t~t~(ied that he is an attorney andipl:e,pared_,;.:\J.:·twl~~ Qfil»enrporation for the Baird
Robbibs 'D~·iiiing (_)btHpan~;,; .Inc. and that upon the

and

in('orpb'ra~hni;, P3;lfl:JfWSffiJfii~O~f·les ceased (R. 193, 194,
1
1
& 198). · · · i'.-·. " · · /1l '_rl" '"~rr"J '-~· ::
•••.

·-~

.., .. J .

Lu

·:.

J.

dfll f. .•

J,

The corporation u1ade social security and unemployInen t payu1ents l t>ru~ ttsi eirtiploYte~s: fdtrltlmidrillif1g of the

1 rL

Slaug~, \\~ ~l~ (~. 999}).. T~e. co.rng~at1on

also made with. . rJ} L lf"" .. >th I H f(J .7:
~lpi~g ta;x JAA}~~ e1ilt1is ·, ( ,t~ 2.~Q,)! rr i 111 i \>[,
'i ') Wilhlafun·J. Hi&Tris~siti~ierl <fbJhirhe Respondent that
he'>'\"a~'!sales··~no''creditl 'truinage!f~<a!Jd was acquainted
i
\
l'.lf: r\fr~•, ·~!\fr(~! Iff• 'to
witl1 Merton E.! BB:lt_d . ~~~.j~~~~:~J9·)~~>s office in June or
July, 1949 (R. 160). Mr. Baird told him he had a silent
.,

_

•

~

,

t

~

.

.I

J

I

1 '

J

('I

'

part~~ I( ri:P rthe) w&Jrl i<J~"Si~iP,~ ;lpij-W!MfH~m~dl H. L. R.o bbins
.1

and."he, aJs·o -said1there..we:Vel othevsihr£alt Lake City that
~~r~) ilit~rested~ ~a<r 'filianJifii> inte:rm!t in the lease and

Well
-~

iieing ·.~riil~d.:
I

'.

••

.

I

•

:The''~D.)Y' Q~~~ df.1,~ihose
I

'

•

-

)

I

''"

J /

J

he mentioned

)

at:~hat ~i~e..w:~s yove;y~~):~~t;h~ di<;l;nqt say which Covey

it.was· (R~ .161:). MF. Harris never ~cailed Mr. c·ovey about
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the state1nents ~fr. Baird had made and no particular
~Ir. CoYey \Yas Inentioned ( R. 169).
The sales inYoices in this case are n1ade out to Baird
and Robbins Drilling Company, 16¥2 South Main Street,
Salt Lake City, r:tah (Exhibits J. K. and P) and son1e
of then1 are u:ade sin1ply to Baird and Robbins at the
san1e address (Exhibits L and M). One check from the
Baird and Robbins Drilling Co1npany, Inc., was made to
the Resondent being a payn1ent on account (Check dated
Jiay 1±, 1949, being No. 481, Exhibit 6) .
. .\ppellants urge but two points on this appeal.
Point One
l\o evidence or law supports or justifies Finding of
Fact No. 6 that the Drilling corporation had no independent
existence, a disregaKI of the corporate entity being unavailable to Respondent.
Point Two
No mining .partnership existed.

ARGUl\1ENT
Point One
No evidence or law supports or justifies Finding of
Fact No. 6 that the Drilling corporation had no independent
existence, a disregard of the corporate entity being unavailable to Respondent.

This is of great in1portance because the corporation
had no interest in the lease. It is a prerequisite to a
ntining·
partnership that there be a joint ownership in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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len~P

or the land. Bentley v. Bros;,ard, 33 Utah 396, 94
Pat'. 7:~(); ill eister v. 1'arrow, 190 Mont. 1, 93 Pac. 2d 753;
l r. 8. r. Wholesale Oil Co. (C.C.A. 10) 154 Pac. 2d 745.
1

I r tlH' eorporation did the drilling and purchased
~upplit~~ frotH

HPS}HHt<l(·nt tltere was no partnership with
.AppPllants and no 1ninjng partnership. The Court avoidPd this que~tion hy finding the eorporation to have no
separa tP existence ( ~-,inding (), I-L 15). The court also
found ( I~'inding 5, R. 1-l) that the \\"ell was drilled by M.
I~. Baird and l I. L. Robbins doing business as Baird and
Robbin~ Drilling Co1upany. This Finding might appear
to follow neee:-:sarily fro111 E.,inding No. 6, disregarding
the corporate entity. If :B..,inding No. 6 \Vas beyond the
issue~ available to the llespondent, then the new trial
should have been granted to determine who actually
did the drilling- the corporation or the partnershipwithout any in1pelled conclusion because the corporation
'vas a firtion.
There is 1nuch evidence that the corporation drilled
the well. The Joint Operating Agreement (Exhibit C)
authorized Baird anq Robbins to drill the well through a
closed corporation. The Corporation had just been formed on Dece1nber 31, 1948, when the Agree1nent was finally
signed on January 5, 1949 (R. 194, 197, 198, 19·9). And
Mr. Ruckenbrod testified that upon formation of the corporation the partnership didn't function any more (R.
197). Respondent made no determination of whom or
what Baird and Robbins were, but sent invoices to "Baird
and Robbins Drilling Co." and to "Baird and Robbins"
(Exhibits K, L, M, 0, and P).
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~xhibit~

4 and j are checkbooks of the corporation
showing that drilling expenses were paid with corporation checks. 1'he corporation paid incon1e \vithholding,
~orial ~ecurity and unenlplO)i'l.nent taxes on the drilling
operation~ (R. 209-210). The bank account at Vernal was
in the nan1e of ·'Baird and Robbins Drilling Co., Inc."
(Exhibit S and ~xhibits marked Bank of Vernal" including check~ and statements). The Continental Bank and
Trust Cornpany account was in the nau1e of ''Baird and
Robbins Drilling Co. (Exhibit F, G, and envelope marked
July, 1948) but the checks used in that account were
plainly marked '•Baird and Robbins Drilling Co., Inc."
(Exhibits 6, 7, 5 and envelope marked July, 1949).
H

There is no evidence that Respondents 1nade any inquiries about who was drilling the well and who would
pay for it. Respondent simply sold supplies without credit
investigation. There were no fraud, 1nisleading, misrepresentations, reliance or change of position. Respondent now seeks to create a \Vindfall for itself by proving
a partnership it never relied on in extending credit.
In order to claim that the corporation was a fiction
the person making the claim must have been misled or
must have relied to his prejudice on representations.
The law as to disregarding entity is discussed in Sections 7 and 8 of 13 Am. Jur. on Corporation~ as follows:
"The doctrine that a corporation is a legal
entity existing separate and apart fron1 the persons composing it is a legal theory introduced for
purposes of conv~nience and to subserve the ends
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Of justice. 'ehe <~On<~ept <~annot, therefore, be extl~lldt~d to a point beyond ih; reason and policy,

and whPu invoked in support of an end subversive
of this poli<·y, \vill be disregarded by the courts.
'l~hu~, iu an appropriate <'a~e and in furtherance
of tlu~ Pnds of justi<·<~, a torporation and the indi\'idual or individuals owning all its stock and
a~~Pts \\'ill lH· treated as identical, the corporate
(~ntity being disregarded where used as a cloak
or ('OY(•r for fraud or illegality."
.Annotations on the question are at·l A. L. R. 610 and
34 A. L. R. ;>97. The general rule is that the corporate

entity will not Le di~regarded, \\'ith exceptions to this
rule \\·here ereditors \rould be defrauded, where corporation~

are for1ued to avoid liability under contracts, or

where individuals have attempted to shield then1selves
through a corporation. The latter annotation at page
602 quotes a rule for relief from Minifie v. Rowley, 187
Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 :
"Before the acts and obligations of a corporation can be legally recognized as those of a particular person, and vice versa, the following combination of circu1nstances n1ust be made to appear: First, that the corporation is not only influenced and governed by that person, but that
there is such a unity of interest and ownership that
the individuality, or separateness, of the said person and corporation has ceased; second, that the
facts are such that an adherence to the fiction of
the separate existence of the corporation would,
under the particular circumstances, sanction a
fraud or promote injustice."
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In Surgical Supply Center r. Ind~tstrial Com.m.ission
(lrtah 1950) :2~~~ I)nr. 2nd 593 at page 596, the Court discussed the rules as to disregarding a corporate entity
in a ease entirely different on its facts and observed:
.. ,,~ e recog·nize that the court~ have often
looked through the Yeil of corporate structure in
order to prevent fraud or injustice. Old Ben Coal
Co. Y. l-.-niversal Coal Co., 248 ~{ich. 486, 227 N. W.
79-!: People ex rei. Attorney General v. Michigan
Bell Telephone Co., ~.:t-G ~fich. 198, 224 N. W. 438.
Ho,vever, no question of fraud is involved in the
present case, and 've find no occasion to disregard
the corporate entities of the t'vo plaintiffs."
.J..\.lso in Gea,ry cs. Ca.in, 79 l-.-tah 2'68, 9 l:>ac. 2nd 396,
the Court was dealing with fraudulent conveyances to a
corporation and the possibility of ignoripg the legal fiction in order to prevent fraud, holding, however, that because the stockholders were not the persons accused of
con1mitting fraud, and that they· did not hold the stock
of the corporation in trust for the fraudulent person the
corporate fiction could not be disregarded but did say:
'"Courts of equity and courts of law as well,
and courts which administer both law and equity
in the sa1ne action, as do the courts of this state,
will, to prevent fraud and accomplish justice, in
proper cases ignore the legal fiction that a corporation is a person separate and distinct from
the person or group of persons who o'vn its stock.
Western S-ecurities C.o. v. Spiro, 6'2 Utah 623, 221
P. 856; D. I. Felsenthal Co. v. Northern Assuranre
Co.,
2H4
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and annotation on page 610. * • * The doctrine
si1nply 1neans that the courts, ignoring forms and
looking to the substance of things, will regard the
stockholders of a corporation as the owners of its
property, or as the real parties in interest, whenever it is necessar~· to do so to prevent a fraud
which rnight otherwise be perpetrated, to redress
a wrong which might otherwise go without redress, or to do justice which rnight otherwise fail.
It cannot be applied in this case, which is an action against the corporation and a person who
holds but one share of its stock, so long as it appears that there are other stockholders, who are
not parties to the action, owning all but one of the
outstanding shares and it is not made to appear
that they hold the same in trust for Addison Cain."
There is no evidence that a~ter July 12, 1949, the
date of the first sale by Respondent, there was any act
connected with drilling except by and on behalf of the
corporation. There is no evidence to support Finding
No. 5 and it n1ust be assu~ed that it follo,ved, in the
Court's reasoning, from Finding No. 6. This is a fallacy,
because even if the corporate entity is to be disregarded
the result would be to treat the stockholders as the responsible parties individually. Assume a joint venture
between the corporation and Appellants and then such
facts as require the corporate entity to be disregarded.
Would not the result be to place the corporate obligation
on the stockholders, without any expansion of the obligations of the Appellants~ The case of Geary v. Ca.i.n
(supra) seems apt. If there is fraud or other equitable
basis for disregarding the corporate entity the stockSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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holders 'vill be held accountable but the rule will not
apply where the stockholders are strangers to the fraud.
8o here, if the corporate entity is disregarded the brunt
of ~he burden '\>Vould fall, not on the stockholders of the
c-orporation or on the persons responsible for creation
of the corporation but on Appellants whose only offense
was to deal \vith the corporation. The judgrnent of t4e
Court allowing recovery against Appellants was based
in part upon the finding that the corporation was a fiction, which is wholly unsupported in the evidence and
which is a position not available to Respondent against
these Appellants. Furthermore, there is no evidence
to support the finding that the \vell was drilled by the
partnership, and even if there were, that evidence is so
'veak as to indicate that the court's finding was largely
based upon its views that the corporate entity could be
disregarded. ..:-\ ne-\v trial should have been gran ted to
determine, entirely apart from any tendency to disregard
the corporate entity whether the well was actually drilled
by the corporation or the partnership. The burden of
proof as to this was on Respondent.
Point Two
No mining partnership existed.

F·or two reasons there was no 1nining partnership,
apart from the questions raised under Point One:
First, there was no sharing of loses;
Second, there \vas no joint control or operation.
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was no ::;haring of losses.
J lad there been no mention of losses the law might
iutply a sharing of lo:-;s<~s from a general operation togPt her and t'rotu thP sharing of profits. Appellants adutit tJtat th(l ,joint operating agreernent provided for division of profit~, 1~';~ to Appellants and 88% to Baird and
Hobbins. But this agreeH1ent was drawn to negative a
sharing of losses and specifically accomplishes that. "The
l ~o,·pys \vere willing to purchase interests only on certain <·ondi tions '' (It 199) and the joint operating agreeIn en t contains those provisions, as above quoted at pages
4 to 12.
Paragraph IA of tlte Joint Operating Agreement
li1nits the inYe::;tinent to $16,000 plus the purchase of pipe
(Par. ID) the $16,000 to be used for "Development of
Well One" (Par. 1\.. ) and "no part of any costs or expenses for the drilling of said well * * * shall be charged
or be a clairn upon the second parties." A corporation
owned by Baird and R.obbins could drill the well "in which
event it is understood said corporation shall have no
claim against the second parties, nor any lien against
said leasehold* * *" (Par. I\rB). And further: "Ope-rator
shall, at all ti1nes, keep the joint interests of the parties
hereto in and to the leases and product therefron1 and
equiprnent free and clear of all labor and mechanic's liens ·
and encumbrances." (Par. VIII A).
The cases have not, and this Court surely will not,
impose a liability for losses on parties who have specifically contracted that the losses shall be borne by Baird
and Robbins. No policy of .the law suggests this and no
Jt'irsl, there
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of an oil develop1nent venture on the theory of partner~
~hip. At pag-PH 217-218 of 250 N. W. the Court held:

u• • • that,

while it is not necessary that such
agrt.. eHu·nt Hhould he express as to all its terms,
it iH ne<·e:.;:.;ary that it he shown that it was the
UJulerstandiHg and intention of the parties that
thert~ be a eOHllltUnitv of interest in capital a
..
'
Hharing of the profits, and a rnutual liability for
the losses; and that, in the absence of any one
of these ele1nents, there can he no real partnership. • • •
.. It is quite true that this court has repeatedly
stated that it is not necessary that there be an express agreen1ent e~tablishing mutual liability for
losses, and that, where the com1nunity of interest
in capital and division of profits is clearly shown,
the 1nutual liability for losses \vill be _implied unless shown to be inconsistent 'vith the intention
of the parties. It is equally clear that under our
decisions an express agree1nent on the subject of
losses will control, and that, if such agreement
provide for nonliability for losses, this fact alone
will negative the existence of a partnership. As
said in ''eenstra Y. Mathews, 194 Iowa 792, 190 N.
W. 382, 383; 'It is strenuously argued by the defendant that there was no partnership because
there was no agreement for a divsion of losses.
It is true that there was no express agreement
for such division. It is not essential that there
should be, though it is essential to the existence
of a partnership that there be a mutual liability
for losses. In the absence of express agreement
on the subject of losses, the mutual liability for
losses will be implied where the fact of partnership is established by other evidence. Of course,
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if there be an expre~~ agreeu1ent on the subject
of losses, such agreen1ent \Yill eontrol. If such express agree1uent negatiYe the sharing of losses,
it negatiYes the partnership.' * * *
~~ \Yhere a n1an has contributed his 1noney to
and taken the risk of losing it in an enterprise,
\Yith the distinet understanding and agreement
that he shall not be liable for any greater amount
than the n1oney thus contributed, "\Ve are unable
to see the justice or reasonableness of a doctrine
"?hieh says that he n1ust nevertheless be held liable
to one \Vho has dealt with such enterprise, with
full kno,v1edge of the tern1s of the agree1nent that
the n1an who contributed his Inoney to such enterprise shall not be liable for any of the debts thereof."
.A._nd in our ease, where there was no knowledge in Respondent about a possible partnership, Respondent is in
no better position than if it had known all about the
agreement. 68 C. J. S. Partnerships, pp. 429-430 thus
states the rule:
~'Accordingly,

as a general rule, the absence
of a liability to bear the losses or expense of a
business ordinarily indicates that no partnership was intended or exists, and it has been held
that, where the effect of an agreernent between
two or rnore persons in relation to the prosecution
of an enterprise provides that, although all are to
share in the profits one of their number shall inc-qr no risk and be chargeable \Vith no loss, the
agreen1ent is not one of partnership.''

Second, there wa.s no ,joint control or operation.
The Joint Operating Agreen1ent (Exhibit C) proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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vidE·d thut B<)pPrator" (Baird and Robbins or their cor1)orat iou) Hhould <·arry on the drilling operation. This
agTPetuent g-ave "Operator" the "sole right of prospecting and PX ploring tl1e landH" subject to the agreernent
(Par. Ill A) ; gave "()perator" the sole right and discretion to hire and (•ontrol (~n1ployees "and such employees
shall IH~ tlu~ (•tuployees of tlH~ operator and under its
sole di reetion and orders'' (Par. IIIB) ; and all Appellants had \ven~ the rights of inspection and infor1nation
(Par. ,~. liB). This lack of joint operation prevented
i1nplication of a partnership or the arising of a partnership including Appellants as members.
J.~JcAnally

Cochran (supra); U. S. v. Wholesale
Oil Co. (C. C. A. 10), 154 Fed. 2d 745; Johatnson Brother$
Builders v. Board of Revieu:, Industrial Comm.ission
(l. . tah 1950) 222 Pac. 2d 563, 567; Bentley v. Brossard
(supra); 131 A. L. R. 508, 540, 541; 68 C. J. S. 425-426;
58 C. J. S. 688; 4 Summers, Oil and Gas, Sees. 723, 724.
The requisites of a 1nining partnership are thus stated in
58 c. J. s. 688 :
1/.

"With respect to the elements of the relation
of a mining partnership, each case must necessarily be determined by it own facts. However,
there are three basic require1nents which 1nust always be present for the creation and existence of
the relationship, and they are co-ownership, joint
operation, and an agreement to share in profits
and losses. It has been also held that, in addition
to the above, cornmunity of interest and mutual
agency are also necessary. * * *"
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Thi~

treatise goes on to eonsider these three eletnent~ in greater detail, ~tating that joint ovvnership is
not sufficient to n1ake a Inining partnership, nor is mutual agency, and as to the requisite of joint operation,
1nake~ thi~ ~tate1nent at page 690:
··Joint operation. .L\.n Agree1nent for cooperation and the joint \vorking of a n1ine is essential to the creation of a rnining partnership; and
in some jurisdictions an actual joint operation or
develop1nent is essential. As a general rule a mining partnership arises when two or more coo,vners or lessees of a 1nining claim actually engage in working it and share according to the interest of each, although there is no express agreeInent bet,veen them to becon1e partners; but 1nere
joint operations of a Inine or well will not necessarily create a partnership.''
·
The same question was discussed in McAnally t:.
Cochran (supra) \vhere an agreernent was rnade to use
well-drilling tools and in consideration thereof to assign
an interest in the lease, the borrowers of the tools undertaking the actual drilling and doing the hiring and paying of e1nployees. The court held that operation of a
1nining lease by co-tenants did not establish a Inining
partnership and quoted the following language from
Gillespie v. Sht~tf/lin, 91 Okl. 72, 216 Pac. 132 at page 956
of 46 Pac. 2d :

"In order to constitute a mining partnership,
the parties must cooperate in developing a lease
for oil and gas, each agreeing to pay his part of
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the expenses and to share in the profits or losses.
:tic •

•

"Inter s·ese, there must be an intention of the
· partners to do so, in order to create a partnership
and such intention cannot be inferred, alone, fro1n
a joint venture in drilling a well."

i

I

l

:

The Court then quoted fro1n the earlier case of Ash et al
v. Mickelson, 118 Okl. 163, 247 Pac. 680:
. "A 1nining partnership or joint adventure
cannot exist, unless there is a cooperation among
the parties in the developn1ent of a lease for oil
and gas, each agreeing to pay his part of the expenses and to share in the profits and losses. * * ·:.:
"The mere holding of an interest in an oil and
gas lease and leasehold estate with other co-tenants and having knowledge that a well 'vas being
drilled thereon by one or more of the co-tenants
does not constitute 'cooperation' as conten1plated
by the authorities herein cited." * «= *
''There is no evidence in the record that shows
or tends to show that the owners of the leasehold
estate ever conte1nplated a partnership among the
various owners of the lease at the time they purchased an interest in the same, some of which were
before the well was ever begun. Neither does
the evidence show or tend to show that there was
any such agreen1ent between the parties during
the progress of the drilling of the well, nor as to
the operation and management of the well after
production was found. The parties never came together for the purpose of perfecting such an arrangement. J. R. Root and F·. S. Hoxie had exclusive control during the drilling of the well and
with no authority to act for any other co-tenant,
and the same is true after they had reached the
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Skinner sand and had decided to n1ake a well
therein. It is not shown that any of the other
parties of interest was ever consulted about employing labor for cleaning the well or doing any
of the other many things necessary to be done at
a ne'v w·ell, or in purchasing tankage or other
equipment necessary therefor. Neither does the
testin1ony sho\\· that the parties in charge had
any authority to act for others."
In United States v. Wholesale O,il Com,pany (supra)
the question \Vas to determine whether a partnership
existed in the operation of retail gasoline filling stations
or 'vhether the relation 'vas that of en1ployer and einployee. The station n1anagers had a monthly drawing
account which was charged against one half of the profits,
the business could not be sold without the approval of the
co1npany and when an operator quit the business there
was an accounting of profits between the1n and no distribution of assets. In holding that there was no partnership the Court stated at page 748:
"Neither did the operator have the right to ex~
ercise his independent judgment in the manageInent and operation of his business. * * * The business was conducted in the name of the company;
the bank account \vas kept in the naine of the company in a bank designated by it; the checks were
written against the account only by the company
and none were written against this account by
the operator save that in an einergency he might
dra'v a check against the account. * * * Neither
did he assume any liability for the debts of the sorailed partnership or joint adventure. He did not
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become liabl<' for merchandise accounts or for
other ohligations incurred by the company."
A~

of joint operation~ this language is close
to thP a<·tivitie~ of the partie~ here. The Baird and Robbin~ ( iotupuny tHad(l all d<~eisions concerning the drilling
of th(• \\'<ll1, <·ontrolled all of the funds in bank accounts
to \\'hi<~h 1\ppellantH \\·erp strangers, purchased all supplies, <jluployed all labor(~rs and supervisory ~mployees,
and never at any titne consulted with Appellants or anyone t.llse eoncerning decisions to be 1nade in the drilling
of the well. It see1us obvious that if Appellants had atteinpted to interfere in any \vay 'vith drilling of this 'vell
as a partner ,,·ould have a right to do, Baird and Robbins
would have pointed to the joint operating agreement
and advised Appellants to ~tay out of the drilling operation. To suppose that Appellants could have made purchases for the drilling of this well and bound Baird and
Robbins thereby would be to stretch this operating
agreen1ent beyond any reasonable interpretation-and
yet, if a n1ining partnership were intended between par-.
ties such activities would have been reasonable. The intention of the parties as expressed in the operating agreement negatives any possible intended joint operation.
In Johanson Brothers Builders v. Boa.rd of R:eview
(supra) the Industrial Commission determined that no
partnership existed under a plan whereby a brick mason
agreed with other brick masons that they would work
together on various jobs all of which would be obtained
by Carl Johanson each of them to share in the profits
a

te~t
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according to a forn1ula. This Court pointed out that
under the l'""tah Statute a partnership is Han association
of two or 1nore per~ on~ to ea rry on as eo-partners ,of a
business for profif. and also that Hall partners have
equal right8 in the n1anagen1ent and eonduet of the partnership business.·' The Court held that no partnership
\ras e~tablished because, as further pointed out at page
567, the bank account \vas carried in the narne of Carl
F. Johanson and \vife and no one else had a right to draw
on it: Johanson rningled contracting business funds with
other ineo1ne; all the equipment belonged to Johanson
and there \vas no acquisition of an interest in such assets
by the other interested parties; and only Carl Johanson
could have contracted for any job. The practical tests
applied to that -case could be equally applied to this case.
Baird and Robbins owned trucks, and presumably some
other equipment (see Exhibits C, Par. I\T B), leased
equipment, rnade all decisions concerning operations,
banked the money in their account, mingling it with other
funds in both the Continental and Bank of Vernal accounts and consulted with Appellants in no particular.
The question of rnining partnership was carefully
considered by this court in Bentley v. Brossard (supra)
in 1908. In that case one Fannof owned a mine and entered into a lease with one Brossard for development of
the mine in equal interests, with the proviso that Fannof
should not be held for any of the expenses or losses.
The lease required Brossard to work and develop the
claiins in a proper manner, to employ a specified number
of 1nen, to sell the ore and divide the proceeds in an
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ngTPPd HtannP r. Fannof could be e1nployed if the operatiull wa~ with HtPatn. I~rossard al~o had the right to pur('ha~tl an inten~~t in U1P property at a given price. Bros:--;anl tlu·n PntPrPd into agreetnent with other people who
\\'PJ'P lltadP <h_.I'PtHlants with hiln in the case, these people
H~n·Ping tu advarw<~ t·<·rtain sums of n1oney "for developHtPnt (Jr ~aid utining <·Jaiuts and the tarrying out of" the
l·'annuf <'Oll tr£u·t. Proceeds aceruing to Brossard were
to },p :--;hared \\' i th the people he interested. Brossard
had <!harg<~ of the \r()rk and supervised it although there
\\·as evidence that the other contributors joined in the
operation and partiti pated in the decisions. Action was
brought by a laborer against Brossard and those interested ,,·ith hitn, and although Fannof testified at the trial
he was not Inade a party defendant.
The trial court sub1nitted the case to the jury on the
question of the n1ining partnership and the Supreme
Court held that the contracts and the evidence constituted a Iuining partnership as a matter of law. Although
Fannof appears to be in the position that the Appellants
are in here, he was not 1nade a party in that action. The
Court held that the contract itself created the relationship of partnership quoting a- decision that the re-quisites
of joining together for the co1nmon benefit, each contributing property or services,- and having a con1n1unity
of interests in the profits was sufficient. (page 407 of 33
Utah). The Court discussed the requirements of sharing
losses and further that the agreement to share profits
with nothing said about losses was prima facie an agreement to share loses which is also necessary to a partnerSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ship (page -!08). ...\t the botton1 of the sa1ne page the court
relies heaYily upon the contract between Brossard and
Fannof "'hieh \\'"as the induce1nen t of the subleases, and it
was this eontract 'vhich eon11nitted the sublessees to the
progrrun of \\'"Orking and developing the rnines in accordance 'vith the lease. It \vas impossible for the1n to undertake to perforn1 the :B,annof contract without associating
themselves together within the contemplation of that
con tract. (page 409). The court also discussed the distinctions between a n1ining partnership and an ordinary
con1mereial partnership. None of these distinctions is
significant in the Bentley case or in the case at bar and
there is no rule that a ruining partnership is more easily
forrned or is formed against the plainly expressed intention of the parties any 1nore than is a com1nercial or
trading partnership. vVe still have to read the contract
and determine its intent. The Court explained the fact of
Brossard's doing the work on the theory that he was
rnade the general Inanager by the partners, and it was
proper for a general n1anager to take control of the operations.
S.pecifically the differences between that case and the
ease at bar are that the contributors in the Bentley case
were necessarily committed to the contract requiring developrnent of the mine and nothing in the sublease negatived the in1plications of full responsibility for carrying
out that contract. In our case there is no obligation of
develop1nent outside the Joint Operating Agreement.
This agreement specifically negatives the joint responsihilitv for n1utual operation as to this well.
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Appellants wer(~ investors in oil and gas leases. They
wanted to be HUre a well was drilled on the property in
whieh they were acquiring an interest. This is a common
pra(·tice and a nor1nal approach which an investor would
take in conne<·tion with purchase of an undivided interest
iu au oil w(~ll. rrll(~ gro,vth of oil exploration in Utah gives
thi:-: <·a:-:(· 111ore Hignificanee than it would have had ten
year~ ago. It is not ordinarily the intention of investors
to becotue }Jartners with well drillers, nor is it the expe('tation of HUppliers to hold interest holders responsible
for u1aterials furnished to well drillers.
In arcordan('~ \\·ith the intention of the parties and
the agreetuent 'v hich was carefully prepared to guard
again~t this very liability, this court should hold that no
1nining partnership arose under the joint operating
agreement.

s·UMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Joint Operating Agreement between the parties
guards against sharing of losses by Appellants which is
significant in detern1ining whether a partnership was intended to arise. The lack of practicable control over the
<;lrilling operation is further evidence that the incidents
of a partnership did not exist and that no partnership
was intended. To argue otherwise is._to contend that the
essentials incidental to a partnership which was carefully
excluded by the agreement will now be· made a part of
the agreement by force of law. This would not only ignore the intention of the parties but destroy .their power
to contract. There has been no holding out of partnerSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ship, no representation of any kind and no relianep by
Respondent on the exi8tence of a partnership or on the·
~redit of ~\.ppellants. There is no reason to disregard
the corporate entity and the Court should hold the finding as to that erroneous and prejudicial and, either grant
a new trial, or direct that the judginent be vacated and
judgn1ent of no cause of action entered.
Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD·S AND: BIRD AND
DAN S. BUSHNELL,
Attorneys for App-ellants
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